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STATE1fENT OF FACTS
A summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
each of them was entered in this case on November 10,
1955 (Tr. 7). The summary judgment w.as granted upon
a motion which was based upon the pleadings and deposition of the plaintiff (Tr. 5).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the plaintiff was
a guest in the home of the defendants at 1754 Oakridge
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The plaintiff asked to be directed to the lavatory in said home and was carelessly
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and negligently directed by the defendant Wilma L.
Richardson toward a door which, urhrnown to the plaintiff, but well known to the defendants, opened not into
the lavatory but onto a stairway leading to the basement
of said home; that the door to which plaintiff's attention
was directed was constructed and maintained in a negligent manner creating a hidden trap unknown to the
plaintiff but known to the defendants (Tr. 1-2).
Defendants set forth the defense that the complaint
failed to state a claim against the defendants. They further alleged that the plaintiff was a guest insofar as the
dining room, living room, kitchen and bathroom of said
home were concerned but was not .a guest of the defendants insofar as the remaining portions of said hon1e were
concerned; that the defendants were not negligent and
that if plaintiff suffered injury or damage the same was
caused or proximately contributed to by the negligent
.acts or omissions of the plaintiff (Tr. 3).
The references to the testimony given by plaintiff
on her deposition will be referred to by the page numbers
of the deposition which is marked Transcript page 11.
:Mrs. Tempest in her deposition testified that she had
known the Richardsons for a long time and considered
thmn good friends. There is confusion as to whether she
had been in this particular house before the evening of
August 12, 1D5-1-, but if so, it had only been upon one or
two occasions (D. 2-4).
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On August 12, 1954 Mrs. Tempest arrived at the
Richardsons' home about 5 or 5 :30 P.M. and went into
the living room and then out onto the patio (D. 6). The
floor plan of the home as described by Mrs. Tempest is
as indicated in defendant's Exhibit 1 attached to the
deposition (D. 7-12). About 7:00 o'clock they went into
the dining room for dinner. Around 9:30 Mrs. Tempest
went into the kitchen with Mrs. Richardson and after a
short time in the kitchen Mrs. Tempest walked into the
utility area and while walking across that area said: "I
am going to the lavatory." Mrs. Richardson answered:
"The light is on." (Tr. 13-14). "\Vhen Mrs. Tempest
re.ached the hall she saw that there was a door open and
a light shining out into the hall, but she did not remember
of any light being on in the hall itself. :Mrs. Tempest
walked down the hall to the lighted door or room, looked
in and did not see the lavatory but saw a door right next
to the den or bedroom, which door was closed (Tr. 14).
She did not see any other light in the utility area and did
not see the bathroom. l\Irs. Tempest had w.alked past the
bathroom when she went into the utility area but did not
know it was there and saw the light shining from the room
into the hallway. There was plenty of light in the hallway
so that she could see her way ( Tr. 15). After she had
looked into the den or bedroom and did not see the lav.atory she opened the door next to it with her right hand
and walked forward and immediately fell. The door
swung in, but there was no light on and she did not see
the stairway. There is no landing inside the doorway
leading to the stairway .and the first step down is right
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next to the hall floor so that there is a sheer straight
drop down the stairs (Tr. 16-17). As she did not see
the bathroom she does not know whether there was a
light on or not (Tr. 20).

~:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL
FACT.
(a) DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THEIR
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY
TO PLAINTIFF.

(b)

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.

ARGUl\1:ENT
1. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL
FACT.
(a) DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THEIR
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY
TO PLAINTIFF.

The only question involved is whether after consideration of the pleadings and deposition of the plaintiff there
is or is not .a genuine issue as to a material fact. There
is no dispute in this case but that plaintiff while in defendant's home was a social guest and is considered a
licensee. lllcflcnry v. Ilozrells, et al., (Ore.) 272 P. 2d
210 (1954).
Plaintiff being a licensee, the defendants owed her
the duty to use reasonable care not to injure her through
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any act of negligence on their part and to warn her of
dangerous conditions which they knew but which they
could not reasonably assume that she knew or by a reasonable use of her faculties would observe. Deacy v.
11lcDonnell, et al. (Conn.) 38 Atl. 2d 181 (1944).
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 342, Page
932.
"DANGEROUS CONDITIONS KNOWN TO
POSSESSOR. A Possessor of land is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous
licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has
reason to believe that they will not discover the
condition or realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable
care
(i)

to make the condition reasonable safe, or

(ii) to warn them of the condition and the
risk involved therein."
\Vith this premise established and which we do not
believe will be questioned, we come to the question
whether under the pleadings and the testimony given by
plaintiff it could be said that no re.asonable person could
find that the defendants or either one of them were not
negligent and that their negligence was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.
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In this case Mrs. Tempest was not familiar with the
premises and after leaving the kitchen where she and
Mrs. Richardson had been together 1\Irs. Tempest proceeded some distance across the utility room. As she
was so proceeding she told Mrs. Richardson that she
was going to the lavatory and Mrs. Richardson stated
that the light was on. No statement or warning was
given to 1\Irs. Tempest regarding the cellar stairway.
The evidence does not disclose whether Mrs. Richardson knew that 1\frs. Tempest had already passed the
lavatory, if in fact she had, nor does the evidence disclose
that :Mrs. Richardson was aware that the light was on
in the den or bedroom, that being the room right next
to the door to the cellar steps.
We can, however, assume that 1\frs. Richardson was
familiar with her own home and knew that if one had
proceeded across the utility room to the hall that they
would not observe the bathroom which was recessed off
the utility room. If she knew the light was on in the
bedroom or den then she knew or should have known
that a person reaching the hallway would be attracted
thereto and finding that it was not the bathro01n might
try the door adjacent thereto which opened onto a stairway leading to the basement. ~Irs. Richardson did know
that the door to the stairs opened inward and that the
step dropped innnediately down, there being no platform
flush with the hall floor and that one taking a step forward through the door would immediately descend
downward.
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Under such circumstances can it be said that no
reasonable person would not come to the conclusion that
Mrs. Richardson was negligent in not warning Mrs.
Tempest of the stairway 1 If, in fact, Mrs. Richardson
knew how far Mrs. Tempest had passed across the utility
area would not this have a bearing on the situation 1
If so, we have a material fact which must be determined.
The same conclusion would be true concerning the question as to whether or not Mrs. Richardson knew that the
light was on in the bedroom and that the door was open
so that ~\Irs. Tempest might be attracted thereto.
In the case of Wardhaugh v. Weisfield's, Inc.
(Wash.) 264 P. 2d 870 (Dec. 1953) the defendant had
constructed a ramp in its store in such a manner that it
looked as though it were level. The Court held that such
deceptive condition may be considered as negligence.
In this case if plaintiff had attempted to go to the
lavatory ·without instructions and had received injuries
the question would be entirely different. However, plaintiff was instructed that the light was on. She proceeded
to the lighted room as instructed which turned out to be
a den or bedroom rather than a bathroom .and she had no
warning that the door next thereto guarded a dangerous
stairway leading to the basement.
In the case of Hamblet v. Buffalo Library Garage

Co., Inc., 225 N. Y. Supp. 716, a person on the premises
was instructed how to reach the lavatory and the Court
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held that plaintiff had the right, to a certain extent, to
rely upon instructions and to govern his conduct accord-

I:

ingly.
In the case of Deacy v. McDonnell, et al., supra,
where the plaintiff went to visit her sister who was a
servant in the home of the defendants and it became
time for plaintiff to leave, the servants of the defendant
failed to turn on the light so that plaintiff might discover
the step down to the porch and by reason thereof she
fell. The Court held :

~

j:
1

"It was for the trial court to determine as
a question of fact whether the situation was or
was not one in which the servants could not reasonably assume that the plaintiff knew or by
the reasonable use of her senses would discover
the step down to the porch and which, therefore,
fell within the principle under which an owner
is bound to take precautions to protect a licensee
of whose presence he knows .against a dangerous
condition upon the premises. It could reasonably
reach the conclusions that it was the servants'
duty either to turn on the lights or warn her of
the danger created by the step and that, for their
breach of that duty, the defendants are responsible. These conclusions are sufficient to sustain
the ruling that there was .a breach of the duty
which the defendants owed the plaintiff."
In addition to the facts testified to in plaintiff's
deposition, it appears to us that there are material facts
that would have to be detennined before the Court could
say that there was no negligence on behalf of the defend-
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ants or either one of them. A very material fact would be
whether or not Mrs. Richardson knew at the time she
advised Mrs. Tempest that the light was on that Mrs.
Tempest had already passed the entr.ance to the bathroom
and was in the hallway. Another fact would be whether
or not 1\frs. Richardson knew that the light was on in the
den or bedroom. These two facts are very important for
the reason that if Mrs. Richardson answered both of these
questions in the affirmative she knew or should have
known that l\Irs. Tempest would then have been misguided and led to the bedroom rather than the bathroom.
We also know that Mrs. Richardson was aware or should
have been aware of the type of stairway just adjacent
to the door to the den or bedroom. She knew that the
door opened inwardly. Under such circumstances she had
a duty to warn Mrs. Tempest of the stairway or to direct
Mrs. Tempest's attention to the fact that she had passed
the bathroom.
The case of Young et al. v. Felornia et al., ______ Utah
______ , 244 P. 2d 862 (1952) involved a dispute of grazing
rights in the State of Utah. An appeal was taken by the
defendants from a summary judgment. The motion of
summary judgment was b.ased upon the pleadings and a
stipulation and the issues established by the court in its
pretrial order. The Court held after quoting Rule 56 (c)
U.R.C.P. as follows:
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the
motion should be denied."
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(b)

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.

Is .an individual negligent who opens a door which
opens away from him and takes a step forward at the
same time even though the room or space that he steps
forward into is dark? Does not one have the right to
assume that where a door opens inwardly that there will
be .a floor beyond, not just a vacant space and if there is
a stairway on the other side of the door there will be a
first step or platform which will be level with the floor~
In the present case the facts would not warrant the
finding of negligence or contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff had been directed to the bathroom. She
was advised that the light was on. When plaintiff discovered that the romn was not a bathroom, was she not
justified in trying the door next to it? Would not a
reasonable and prudent person open a door and take a
step forward in order to turn on the lightY Certainly we
would not say that a reasonable and prudent person under such circumstances would push the door wide open
and stand back rather than take a hold of the door and
move forward as the door opened, nor would an ordinarjl~, reasonable person anticipate and expect that if he
should take a step forward in the darkness that he would
be i1n1nediately precipitated down a flight of stairs.
The ease of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, _____ _
1Jtah ______ , 289 P. 2d 196 (1955) was a case involving the
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destruction of a truck and trailer claimed to have been
caused by another truck and trailer approaching on the
highway. The Court states:
I

"Therefore, if there is any reasonable basis,
either because of the lack of evidence, or from
the evidence and the fair inferences to be derived
therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, upon which any reasonable mind could
conclude that it was not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence either (a) that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that
such negligence proximately contributed to cause
the injury, then the refusal of the trial court to
find plaintiff contributorily negligent must be
sustained.''
~~

;he no!
not i

t~e~

nlyw1

Frmn this expression this Court has indicated that
if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the
acts heretofore referred to constitute contributory negligence, then the m.atter would be a question for a jury to
determine and certainly would not permit the entry of
a judgment of dismissal or summary judgment.

ron nn·

eo~en

or ana
orilin·

tif he
wonM

:s.
~, ······

gilie

In the case of Rogalski v. Phillips Petrolettm Co., 3
Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, the plaintiff while steam
cleaning his employer's truck fell into a vat containing
caustic soda. The Court in discussing the question of
contributory negligence held as follows:
"It has been frequently .announced by this
court that contributory negligence is a question
for the jury unless all reasonable men must draw
the same conclusion from the facts as they are
shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah
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46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake
City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708;
Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679. As
was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah
134,58P. 355,358:
" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law, but of fact,
and to be settled by a jury; and this, whether the
uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony,
or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded
men will honestly draw different conclusions from
them.'"
The c.ase of Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 Utah 68, 202
P. 2d 547 (1949) involved an intersection accident. The
Court states :
" 'Each case must turn upon its o"'Ll f.acts.
Contributory negligence as a matter of law, can
only be found where reasonable minds cannot but
conclude that a reasonable careful and prudent
person situated as was plaintiff would not have
acted as he did. The situations where a court will
so declare are rare. * * *"
In the case of J(Jii.qllf v. Soutl1en1 Pac. Co., 52 Utah
42, 172 P. 689 (1918) brought for the recovery of the
negligent killing of certain horses the defendant set up
the defense of contributory negligence and the Court held
in discussing contributory negligence as follows:
"While it is true, and this court has so held
in cases too numerous to cite here, that the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, like that of original negligence on the
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p.art of the defendant, is ordinarily a question of
fact for the jury, and can only in rare instances
be disposed of as a question of law, yet it is also
true that this court, in common with other courts,
has also very frequently held that, where the
evidence is undisputed and is not conflicting, and
is such that reasonable men may not deduce conflicting inferences therefrom or arrive at different conclusions, then the question of necessity is
purely one of law to be determined by the court."
The Washington Supreme Court in the case of

Wardhattgh v. Weisfield's, Inc., supra, states:
"The issue of contributory negligence should
not be taken from the jury unless the acts done
were so palpably negligent as to preclude the
possibility of a difference of opinion. McBeath v.
Northern Pac. R. Co., 32 Wash. 2d 910, 204 P. 2d
248."
"Nor is contributory negligence chargeable
to one who was deceived by .appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person.
Brandenburg v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 28
Cal. 2d 282, 169 P. 2d 909 ~ Bradley v. Allis Hotel
Co., 153 Kan. 166, 109 P. 2d 165; Rue v. Wendland,
226 l\1inn. 449, 33 N.W. 2d 593; Manley v. Haus,
113 Vt. 217, 32 A. 2d 668."
38 Am. Jur., Section 184, Page 861.
"As it generally is expressed, a plaintiff will
not be held to have been guilty of contributory
negligence if it appe.ars that he had no knowledge
or means of knowledge of the danger, and conversely, he will be deemed to have been guilty if
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it is shown that he knew or reasonably should have
known of the peril and might have avoided it by
the exercise of ordinary care."
This statement is cited with approval in the case of
Martin v. Jones, ______ Utah ______ , 253 P. 349 and in the case
of Knox v. Snow, ______ ·utah ______ , 229 P. 2d 874.
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that there are
material questions of fact to be determined before it can
be stated that Mr. or Mrs. Richardson were not negligent,
and from the -evidence introduced it cannot be said, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff was negligent, and the
court erred in entering its summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 1\;IATTSSON

Attorneys for Appellant
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